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RIGHTS 
 
Etymologically connected to ‘the right’, which is concerned with correct action, the plural concept 
of rights developed in the modern period, primarily as the assertion of the individual’s right to 
private property. But the connection between rights (plural) and right (singular) is not simply 
etymological but also conceptual, for a particular right must necessarily be located in a wider 
scheme of rights. The focus of this entry is on the concept of rights rather on justifying particular 
schemes of rights. After analysing different kinds of rights – claims, privileges, powers, and 
immunities – the conceptual unity of those four forms is discussed. Two theories of what holds 
rights together dominate the conceptual debate: will theory and interest theory. On will theory to 
have a right is to be in a position to change your legal position vis-à-vis other rights-holders, while 
benefit theorists hold that having a right involves benefitting from other people acting in certain 
ways towards you. Although advanced as purely conceptual the two theories do have normative 
implications. For will theorists it is difficult to attribute rights to foetuses, animals, or very young 
children, although they may be protected in other ways. Benefit theorists are better able to 
accommodate such entities as right-holders, but at the price of conceptual clarity.  
 
 
    Hohfeld’s Analytical Scheme 
In his book Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (first published 
1923) American jurist Wesley Hohfeld argued that there are four forms of right (or rights), but eight 
‘fundamental legal conceptions’. This is so because rights are relations, and there are two types of 
relationship: correlation and opposition. The jural opposite of a right is the legal position that is 
necessarily excluded by having a right, so one cannot, for example, have both a privilege and a duty 
with regard to the same action. The jural correlative is the legal position that is necessarily imposed 
upon another, such that if, for example, a person has a claim-right then somebody else – an 
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individual or a group – must have a duty. Although Hohfeld talked of eight conceptions, it is easier 
to think in terms of four rights – claims, privileges, powers, and immunities – each bearing two 
kinds of relationship, opposition and correlation: 
 
Claims 
The jural opposite of a claim is a no-claim and the jural correlative is a duty. To possess a claim is 
to stand in a position legitimately to demand something from another person (or persons). The other 
person is under a duty to perform the demanded action, and the clearest example is the creation of a 
claim-right as the result of a contract (in a contract we exercise powers in order to create claims: see 
below for a discussion of powers). If, for example, you buy an airline ticket, then you have entered 
into an agreement with the airline company that they will supply you with a seat on a specified 
flight, and you have a claim against them, such that were they to deny you that seat they will suffer 
a penalty. However, claims need not be the result of a contract – benefit theorists (discussed below) 
argue that children, for example, have claims even if they lack powers. 
 
Privileges 
The jural opposite of a privilege is a duty and the jural correlative is a no-claim. Privileges are 
sometimes referred to as liberties (and the correlative a ‘duty not to interfere’). But this is wrong. If 
you have a liberty to do X all that this means is that you are under no obligation not to do X, 
meaning you could be forced to do X. A world in which only ‘liberties’ existed would be one of 
pure conflict: a Hobbesian state of nature. A privilege, however, implies an area of life in which you 
are free to do something which is generally prohibited. The freedom to engage in sexual acts in 
private would be examples of privilege-rights, for these things are normally prohibited in public. 
 
Powers 
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The jural opposite of a power is a disability and the jural correlative is a liability. A power is one’s 
affirmative control over a given legal relation to another. To be that other is to stand in such a way 
as to be liable to have your legal position changed. The act of marriage, as a civil legal procedure, 
involves the (mutual) exercise of powers. The contracting parties, through their actions, alter their 
legal relationship to one another and also their relationship to those outside the contract. Nobody 
else can marry one of the parties unless powers of annulment are first used, and the parties gain 
taxation benefits and so alter their relationship to the state. Although Hohfeld did not make this 
clear, a power operates on a different level to a claim – this is because it is through the exercise of 
powers that many claim-rights are created and extinguished. 
 
Immunities 
The jural opposite of an immunity is a liability and the jural correlative is a disability. To possess an 
immunity is to be in a position to resist the powers of others. Immunities exist, most often, where 
there are different levels of legal authority, such as a legislative authority which creates and 
destroys rights, and a judicial authority that upholds a constitution. The immunities created in a 
constitution exist to insulate the individual from the powers of the legislature: an immunity disables 
the legislature from exercising powers. Immunities are often misleadingly referred to as 
‘fundamental liberties’, but must, in fact, be immunities, since liberties are not intrinsically resistant 
to alteration as a result of legislative action. 
 
     Conflicts of Rights 
Hohfeld’s scheme was analytical, meaning that his aim was to break rights down into specific forms 
rather than provide a theory of how rights relate to one another. The latter is the focus of ‘theories 
of rights’, which will be discussed in the next section. As a preliminary to that discussion a few 
further concepts must be explored; these relate specifically to how rights are held and how conflicts 
between rights can be resolved.  
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Although claims correlate to duties it does not follow that all duties correlate to rights. It is possible 
to have a duty-based system – that is, one in which stress is laid on the performance of a duty. For 
example, it is difficult to couch the right to preserve natural resources in terms of rights. We may 
have duties to future – that is, not-yet-existing – generations, but those duties cannot correlate to the 
rights of ‘future individuals’ because our actions will determine who actually exists in the future. 
Many ecologists argue that the earth (Gaia) is of ultimate moral significance but it is problematic to 
conceptualise the earth as a right-holder and human beings as correlate duty-bearers.  
 
Rights often presuppose conflict, because to have a right is to be advantaged in relation to another 
person; but they are also the means by which conflicts are resolved. A system of rights should 
therefore be compossible – that is, there should be rules whereby conflicts of rights are settled. For 
example, if person A has a right to property x then person B cannot have a right to the same 
property. If both A and B have legal title to the same property then as each exercises the property 
right so each violates the right of the other. Although compossibility is easy to grasp in relation to 
rights to physical space it is more problematic when less tangible goods are involved, such as 
speech or assembly. Certainly, speech requires apportioning time, for not everybody can speak at 
once and assembly is only possible if people do not assemble in the same place at the same time. 
However, the media’s right to report on the activities of a politician and that politician’s right to 
have his reputation protected generates a conflict that is not easily resolved through the idea of 
compossibility. There is here a conflict between different kinds of rights rather than between the 
exercise of the same right by different individuals.  
 
To resolve the conflict between different kinds of rights and also between rights and other political 
principles rights may need to be overridden. To override a right is not to violate it. The former is a 
justified setting aside of a right, whereas the latter is a failure to fulfil the correlative act. In popular 
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debate it is often said that ‘no rights are absolute’. The assertion that the right to free speech is 
absolute is often met with the retort that nobody should be allowed to shout ‘fire!’ in a crowded 
theatre. The implication being that the right to free speech can be overridden by considerations of 
security. However, while correct, too often this is a rhetorical move, rather than a reasoned 
response. To resolve the conflict between free speech and security requires moving to another level 
(or second order), whereby the value of free speech is weighed against other considerations. It is 
significant that whilst Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts without 
qualification that everyone has a right to freedom of opinion and expression the corresponding 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights sets out a range of limitations on free 
speech. Although the Convention draws its inspiration from the Declaration it is a legally 
enforceable code and thus requires recourse to mechanisms for overriding particular rights.  
 
An absolute right is a right that can never be overridden. It is often asserted that torture should be 
absolutely prohibited, and it is significant that Article 3 of the European Convention does indeed 
prohibit torture without qualification. Absoluteness should not be confused with universality: a right 
can be universal but not absolute. There is a logical sense of ‘universal’ which roughly equates to 
the claim that like cases should be treated alike: if two people are identical in all relevant respects 
they should be treated in the same way. The more colloquial sense of ‘universal’ in relation to rights 
is that all humans have attributes that make them equally worthy of respect regardless of 
citizenship. It is possible to assert that there are universal rights – human rights – but none of the 
rights is absolute, meaning that every right can be overridden. What universality would demand is 
that any overriding of a right is applied consistently. Finally, a right may be inalienable. A right is 
inalienable if the right-holder cannot ‘extinguish’ – ‘make alien’ – the right. Selling yourself into 
slavery would be a case of alienation.  
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     Theories of Rights 
Hohfeld’s study was analytical: he wanted to lay out the different forms of rights. He was not 
interested in explaining the underlying connections between them (he thought claims were ‘rights 
proper’, but did not justify this). But political theorists are keen to go beyond analysis and explain 
how the forms come to be ‘bundled’ together. Take the ‘right to private property’. Everybody 
possesses a power to acquire property, and in exercising that power a person comes to acquire a 
claim in a particular piece of property, while in excluding others from the use of that property one 
enjoys a privilege. If the ‘right to private property’ is enshrined in a constitution then you also have 
an immunity. So the right to private property is in fact a bundle of different kinds of Hohfeldian 
rights.   
 
A theory of rights attempts to reconstruct rights into a system by finding some ‘core concept’ that 
can unify the four Hohfeldian rights. The traditional candidates for this core concept are benefit and 
will, the former associated with Jeremy Bentham and the latter with Herbert Hart (Hart is credited 
with identifying Bentham as the progenitor of benefit theory). Benefit theory states that to have a 
right is to benefit from the performance of an enforced duty, or on revised versions, to be intended 
to benefit. Will theory states that having a right involves being in a position to control the 
performance of a duty. Expressed in a less dry way, benefit theory takes rights to be the way 
interests are protected, which is why some theorists prefer the term ‘interest theory’. The right-
holder need not be in a position to assert his/her/its rights. This suggests that non-human animals, 
foetuses and very young children could have rights, because while they have interests they need not 
exercise the rights that are intended to protect those interests. The rights could be exercised on their 
behalf by their parents or the state; in situations where the parents are the potential violators of their 
children’s rights the state will exercise those rights against the parents. Will theory, on the other 
hand, stresses agency: rights are things we use to control our lives. Consequently, a will theorist 
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would be much more restrictive about who can have rights. It would be too simplistic to associate 
benefit/interest theory with the political left, and will theory with the political right, but it is the case 
that those on the left who want to express egalitarian principles in the language of rights will tend to 
stress interests rather than agency. 
 
Will theory is criticised on the grounds that its conception of what it means to exercise a right is 
implausible: the theory seems to require that to have a right one must be in a position to release the 
correlative duty-holder from the performance of his or her duty. But even mature adults have rights 
over which they do not have this kind of control vis-à-vis the duty-bearer. This may, however, rest 
on a faulty interpretation of the theory. On will theory some Hohfeldian rights are first-order and 
others second-order: people exercise second-order powers in order to create first-order claims. For 
example, in most liberal democracies all adults, with some exceptions, have the power to marry and 
they cannot alienate that right. In getting married two people mutually exercise their powers to enter 
into a contract and in the process create claims. People who choose not marry retain their powers 
but create no claims. What, according to will theory, excludes animals and foetuses from this 
scheme is their inability to exercise powers. This does not mean that we lack duties towards animals 
and foetuses, but simply that those duties do not correlate to rights.  
 
Even if the distinction between first-order claims and second-order powers is accepted it may be 
argued that there are many claim-rights that are not created through the exercise of powers and 
which cannot be conceptualised as powers. The right to free speech is neither a power nor a product 
of the exercise of powers and this is likewise the case with many of the rights set out in the 
American Bill of Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the European Convention 
on Human Rights. One way around this problem is to distinguish between benefiting from powers 
and exercising powers. Hillel Steiner suggests that citizens are the third party beneficiaries of 
criminal law duties, and the right-bearers (more accurately, power-bearers) are state officials. The 
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difficulty with this argument is that it does not explain the reality of a constitutional state in which 
the state is – in Hohfeldian language – disabled, meaning that citizens are immune from have their 
legal position changed.  
 
Will theory has received sharper criticism than benefit theory in part because it is an easier target. 
By narrowing the scope of rights – who can have rights and how they are exercised – the theory 
opens itself up to challenge by reference to intuitively plausible counter-examples of the holding 
and exercising of rights that do not fit the model of power-created claims. But benefit theory suffers 
from the converse weakness that it is too broad. Defining rights too widely empties them of any 
interest. It is likely that any mature legal and political system will be constituted by a plurality of 
types of principle and we need to delineate these different principles and show where they conflict 
or how they might operate together.  
 
  Collective Rights, Welfare Rights and Future Generations 
Although there are important normative debates about collective rights (state sovereignty, the right 
to national self-determination, cultural rights), welfare rights (right to development), and the rights 
of future generations (intergenerational justice, preservation of resources), there are also some 
conceptual issues common to all three. Specifically, there are difficulties involved in identifying the 
appropriate right bearer and the good to which the right-holder has an entitlement; and the duty 
which supposedly correlates to the right is frequently indeterminate. Indeterminacy is a problem 
because ‘ought implies can’: if you ought to act in a certain way – whether that ‘ought’ is legal or 
moral – then it must be possible so to act. If you do not know what is required of you then you 
cannot have a duty.  
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Collective Rights 
Rights can be attributed to collective entities, such as firms or states, as well as individual human 
beings. In principle, there is no conceptual problem involved in the idea of collective rights. If the 
right-holder and that to which it has a right can be identified then collectives can have rights. In 
domestic law there are publicly limited companies and these are termed ‘artificial persons’, and in 
international law there exist states. Difficulties arise when the right-holder or the good which the 
right protects cannot be identified. The demand for national self-determination is often problematic 
because the precise territory of the putative state is unclear and there are competing groups claiming 
to speak for that ‘state’. 
 
It is also difficult to claim a right to goods that cannot be individuated. If we assume the truth of 
man-made global warming then all humanity (all states) will benefit from reductions in carbon 
emissions – call this good a ‘clean environment’ – but those who continue to emit will still benefit, 
such that a clean environment cannot be individuated. A clean environment is therefore a ‘public 
good’, in the sense of a good the enjoyment of which cannot be restricted to those who pay for it. 
What is possible is to create an internationally enforceable system of permits held by states to emit 
carbon; such a ‘right to pollute’ implies that a state also has an individuated share in a clean 
environment.  
 
The requirements for a collective right to exist – identifiable right-holder and individuated good – 
has implications for debates over multiculturalism. Against the charge that a commitment to cultural 
diversity implies that ‘cultures’ have rights over their members Will Kymlicka maintains that 
‘rights to cultural membership’ are held by individual human beings against the majority culture. 
Muslims should not be forced by Muslim ‘authorities’ to observe religious practices but rather 
individual Muslims have rights against the non-Muslim majority to practice their religion and for 
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society to be organised in a way that such practice is facilitated so long as it does not carry an 
unreasonable cost to the majority. But this implies that cultural goods – analogously to a clean 
environment – can be individuated in the appropriate way. Maybe individual Muslims benefit from 
the maintenance of Muslim practice even when they choose not to be observant, such that they are 
free-riding on the observance of others. This suggest that the Muslim community rather than 
individual Muslims are the bearers of a right to cultural membership. It should be stressed that this 
is not argument for multiculturalism but purely a conceptual point about the nature of rights.  
 
Welfare Rights 
The idea of a ‘right to welfare’ raises conceptual problems parallel to collective rights: it must be 
possible to identify the appropriate right-holder and for the duty-bearer to know when the duty has 
been fulfilled. In 1969 the United Nations proclaimed the Declaration on Social Progress and 
Development, which sets out principles and objectives for international development. Defenders of 
the right to development maintain that there are socio-economic conditions to the traditional so-
called  ‘negative rights’, such as the right to free speech, freedom of religion, association, marriage 
and so on. To assess the conceptual coherence of this claim we need to locate the holder of the right 
to development and the correlative duty-bearer. It could be that a state, or a community, possesses 
the right to a certain level of resources, or that an individual has the right. If the individual holds the 
right (in Hohfeld’s language: claim), then who has the corresponding duty: that individual’s own 
state, or rich states, or the international community? If states have the right to development then that 
would imply that the only relevant issue of wealth distribution is between states, whereas if 
individuals have the right then the distribution of wealth within a particular state is morally relevant. 
The 1969 UN Declaration is opaque on these points. It defines development as a comprehensive 
economic, social, cultural and political process aimed at the constant improvement of the well-being 
of the entire population, which would imply that the right-holder is the state, but it also asserts that 
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individuals should benefit: development requires the active, free and meaningful participation of the 
citizens of a particular community.  
 
The right to development raises a number of further conceptual problems. First, a set of rights must 
constitute a coherent scheme. The requirements of development may well result in the setting aside 
of certain fundamental ‘negative’ rights; for example, a society which wishes to control urban 
growth may seek to control freedom of movement, choice of occupation and the decision to have 
children. This may appear to be a normative question about the relative weighting of rights, but it is 
conceptual in that no mechanisms are suggested for resolving conflicts of rights. Second, a right to 
development must be actionable, meaning that a remedy can be obtained when a person complains 
that his or her rights have been violated and the duty-bearer must be able to determine when the 
duty has been fulfilled. Although in principle it is possible to draw up a set of material needs is not 
easy to conceive of development as an individuated good. Development may be a good but it is not 
one best advanced by use of the language of rights. It is significant that many societies have ratified 
laws on asylum, and largely respect those laws, but those same societies make it clear that they do 
not accept economic migrants.  
 
Rights of Future Generations 
By ‘future generations’ is meant not-yet-existing people. Although some ecologists argue that the 
case for preserving resources and avoiding further degradation of the planet is a duty owed to 
‘posterity’ that cannot be correlated to any rights, many environmentalists would maintain that we 
have duties correlating to the rights of future generations. This argument raises similar conceptual 
problems to welfare rights but in a more radical form. What we do today will affect not only the life 
prospects of future generations but whether they exist at all.  
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 There is a consensus that population growth is a threat to the quality of life of future generations, 
and the present generation has a duty to see to it that such growth is checked. But it is difficult to 
establish to whom that duty is owed. Imagine we have a fixed level of resources, and in future 
World 1 there are five billion people, while in future World 2 there are twenty billion people. 
Average (per capita) resources will be higher in World 1 and its inhabitants are, therefore, better off 
than the inhabitants of World 2. Does the present generation have a rights-correlated duty to bring 
about World 1? The problem is that one consequence of bringing about World 1 is that a large 
number of people will not exist. The duties of the present generation could correlate to the rights of 
the five billion people in World 1 and the duty is fulfilled by not bringing into existence the extra 
fifteen billion people of World 2, but it is impossible to identify those five billion. The alternative is 
to say that the fifteen billion have a right not be brought into existence, presumably because life in 
World 2 would be intolerable. This suggests that non-existing (never-to-exist) people can have 
rights. Certainly, there have been legal cases involving children who have taken legal action for 
having been born, thus implying that one can have a right not to be brought into existence. 
However, these actions have been motivated by parents acting on behalf of severely disabled 
children against medical authorities who are alleged to have been negligent, with the aim of 
winning damages.  
 
     Right and Rights 
It was argued at the beginning of this entry that there is an etymological connection between the 
‘singular’ right and the ‘plural’ rights. Etymology does not settle conceptual issues, because of the 
genetic fallacy. However, the discussion of compossibility, with the attendant need on occasion to 
balance and limit rights suggest that rights form a system, such that there is a connection of right 
and rights. The relationship between right and rights is important because it may not be possible to 
express all ethical-political relationships in the language of rights. The problem of defining a right 
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to development or the rights of future generations was illustrative of the limitations of ‘rights-talk’. 
To do the right thing is not identical to respecting a person’s rights.  
 
Natural law theorist John Finnis has argued for an intimate connection between right and rights. The 
plural rights, he argues, results from asserting the requirements of justice from the point of view of 
the person(s) who benefit(s) from that relationship. Surveying the development of the concept of 
right from its classical antecedent jus, Finnis notes that for Thomas Aquinas  jus meant ‘the fair’ or 
‘fairness’. Relationships of justice – who is owed what – are secondary. By 1610 the Spanish Jesuit 
writer Francisco Suarez has reversed the priority and defines jus in terms of a moral power which 
each person possesses, and this way of thinking about justice is developed later by Hugo Grotius: 
jus is essentially something a person has – it is a power. There is a development of rights from right. 
For Finnis, this takes what he regards as a damaging turn in the work of Hobbes, who argues that a 
person has rights in the state of nature – that is, a situation in which there is no state, or political 
authority: since nobody is compelled to do anything each is free. The state for Hobbes is the rational 
outcome of the exercise of these ‘natural rights’. But since nobody has any duties in the state of 
nature – for example, nobody is under a duty not to kill you – then we could, Finnis suggests, just as 
well say that there are no rights outside the state.  
 
While Finnis accepts the post-Thomist pluralisation of rights he argues that the Hobbesian tradition 
loses sight of the connection between right and rights. The justification of human rights depends 
upon understanding that connection. The limitations on the rights contained in the European 
Convention on Human Rights are significant: they demonstrate that rights derive their validity from 
an underlying structure of ‘right’. But for Finnis others’ rights do not constitute the only limits: 
there is also reference in the Convention to morality, public morality, public health, and public 
order. These considerations cannot be reduced to the effects on identifiable individuals, but are 
diffuse common benefits. A scheme of human rights, such as the Convention is a way of sketching 
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a common good, which is a umbrella term for the various aspects of individual well-being in a 
community. What the reference to rights contributes to this sketch is simply a pointed expression of 
what is implicit in the term ‘common good’, namely that each and everyone’s well-being, in each of 
its basic aspects, must be considered and favoured at all times by those responsible for co-
ordinating the common life.  
 
Finnis’s argument has implications for human rights. The catalogue of rights set out in the 
Universal Declaration only makes sense within a specific cultural and legal context. This is not a 
rejection of universal human rights, for states can choose to bind themselves to such rights and in so 
doing can acquire or maintain membership in the international community of states. For Finnis 
human rights are the name we give to the legal protection of goods which he maintains all cultures 
(implicitly) value: life, knowledge, ‘play’, aesthetic experience, practical reasonableness, 
sociability, religion (or equivalent secular beliefs about the meaning of life). We do not have to 
accept this aspect of Finnis’s theory to recognise the significance of his broader conceptual point 
about the connection between right and rights: rights form a system, such that alongside a catalogue 
of rights we need secondary rules for settling conflicts between rights. Furthermore, the package of 
rights is just one principle among several and doing right incorporates more than respecting another 
person’s rights.  
 
 
Paul Graham 
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